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APPLYING LAWRENCE: TEENAGERS AND
THE CRIME AGAINST NATURE
DANIEL ALLENDER†
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision striking down a Texas statute
prohibiting homosexual conduct in Lawrence v. Texas is vague in
many ways. The opinion failed to articulate both the contours of the
right the Court was recognizing and the level of scrutiny courts should
apply when enforcing the right. When a question concerning the rights
of minors arises under Lawrence, the answer is even more obscure.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina faced precisely this question in
a 2007 decision, in which the court considered whether Lawrence
prohibited the state from prosecuting a minor for engaging in
nontraditional sexual activity when the minor legally could have
engaged in traditional, vaginal intercourse. This Note argues for an
extension of Lawrence’s right to sexual privacy to minors when those
minors may otherwise lawfully consent to sexual activity. Lawrence
held the state may only infringe an adult’s right to sexual privacy
when the state has some interest other than moral aversion to the
sexual act itself. The Supreme Court has also held that minors
generally share an adult’s right to privacy unless the state has a
significant interest unique to the context of minors to justify the
infringement. Because the state has no interest other than moral
aversion when regulating the form of a minor’s sexual activity, this
Note argues Lawrence should also protect minors.
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INTRODUCTION
At fourteen, R.L.C. was already involved in a sexual relationship
1
with his twelve-year-old girlfriend, O.P.M. Despite their youth, the
adolescents had already engaged in vaginal intercourse on several
occasions. In North Carolina, their conduct was lawful: North
Carolina’s age-of-consent laws permit sexual acts between minors as
2
long as one partner is no more than three years older than the other.
In addition to vaginal intercourse, however, the adolescents had also
engaged in oral sex. Unlike vaginal intercourse, this conduct was
3
problematic. North Carolina prohibits the “crime against nature,”
more commonly known as sodomy. Even though many think of
sodomy as a pseudonym for homosexual activity, traditional
4
prohibitions of sodomy include even heterosexual oral sex. Because
he engaged in heterosexual sodomy, R.L.C. was adjudicated a felony
delinquent, even though the vaginal intercourse was completely
5
6
lawful. In In re R.L.C., the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld
7
his conviction.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v.
8
Texas perhaps appeared to prohibit R.L.C.’s prosecution when it
struck down a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual conduct, the
Court’s opinion did not explain how far Lawrence’s holding reaches.
As this Note interprets Lawrence, prohibitions of sodomy between
adults are unconstitutional violations of an individual’s due process
9
right to privacy. But the Court did not explain whether Lawrence
applies to minors. The Supreme Court of North Carolina

1. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 2007).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.2(a) (2000) (criminalizing “indecent liberties with children”
when the alleged perpetrator is “a person who is under the age of 16 years” only when the
alleged victim “is at least three years younger than the defendant”); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-27.2(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007) (addressing the sexual activity of minors with persons over
the age of sixteen); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A (2000) (same). Section 14–
202.2(a) governs the actions of R.L.C. and O.P.M., as all of the other age-of-consent statutes
deal with sexual activity between minors and persons over the age of sixteen.
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2000) (“If any person shall commit the crime against
nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon.”).
4. See, e.g., State v. Harward, 142 S.E.2d 691, 692 (N.C. 1965) (defining “the crime against
nature” as sexual “acts between humans per anum and per os,” that is, acts of anal and oral sex).
5. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 924.
6. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 2007).
7. Id. at 924.
8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9. See infra Part I.C.
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distinguished Lawrence and upheld R.L.C.’s felony conviction,
holding that minors do not share the same constitutional right to
10
privacy. In this conclusion, North Carolina is not alone: a month
after R.L.C., the Supreme Court of Virginia echoed this analysis in
11
McDonald v. Commonwealth, determining that Lawrence did not
invalidate a statute graduating an otherwise misdemeanor sexual
offense involving vaginal intercourse with a minor to a felony when
12
that same contact involved oral sex.
This Note argues that R.L.C. was wrongly decided. The
constitutional right to privacy adults hold extends to minors in many
circumstances. When the state determines that minors may lawfully
engage in sexual activity, the right to privacy should prevent it from
13
singling out nontraditional sexuality for prosecution. Though
Lawrence itself left the status of minors who engage in sodomy in
doubt, other decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that
minors have the same right to privacy as adults unless the state has a
14
significant interest unique to the context of minors. As this Note
argues, though the state has a significant interest in protecting minors
from the harms of premature sexual activity, after Lawrence, the state
does not have a significant interest in singling out nontraditional
activities that develop within a relationship the state has otherwise
sanctioned. Laws governing the sexuality of minors must treat
traditional and nontraditional sexuality the same.

10. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 925.
11. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918 (Va. 2007).
12. Id. at 924–25. Conceptually, McDonald was very similar to In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at
921, as both addressed the question of sodomy involving minors. The state has an interest in
preventing sexual contact between minors and adults, however, and the issue in McDonald was
a question over degree of punishment rather than criminality in general. Therefore, the
constitutional analysis of McDonald differed slightly from R.L.C. This Note concentrates solely
on the constitutional issues criminality raises.
13. This Note refers to oral sex as a “nontraditional sexual activity” because state criminal
codes have historically called it “sodomy” to discredit it. Survey data the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention has collected, however, indicate that an overwhelming majority
of young-to-middle-aged Americans engage in this conduct. See WILLIAM D. MOSHER, ANJANI
CHANDRA & JO JONES, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND SELECTED HEALTH MEASURES: MEN AND
WOMEN 15–44 YEARS OF AGE, UNITED STATES, 2002, at 25 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics,
Advance Data Report No. 362, 2005), available at http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf
(reporting that 90.1 percent of males and 88.3 percent of females aged 25–44 have engaged in
oral sex).
14. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976)
(holding that minors have a right to seek abortions and states may not restrict that right by
permitting parental vetoes).
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Part I briefly addresses the legal background of both age-ofconsent statutes and sodomy, including the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lawrence, its reception by commentators, and how courts have
applied it in North Carolina and Virginia. Part II analyzes the
competition between the state’s interest in protecting minors and
minors’ interests in sexual privacy. It demonstrates how, when the
state has decided to permit minors to engage in vaginal intercourse,
minors’ liberty interests in sexual privacy prevent the state from
regulating the form of their sexual activity. Finally, Part III discusses
the policy implications of the decisions in R.L.C. and McDonald. It
observes a disconnect between statutory ages of consent and statutory
regulation of minors’ sexual activity. It calls for stronger protection
for minors engaging in sexual activity and a heightened awareness of
the residual animosity toward nontraditional sexuality underlying
these decisions.
I. ADOLESCENCE, LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, AND THE AGE OF CONSENT
A. Statutory Regulation of Sex and Lawrence v. Texas
By the age of seventeen, approximately two-thirds of all
15
adolescents have engaged in consensual sexual activity. This high
percentage forces states to create statutory regimes to protect
adolescents from their own lack of maturity and from potential
exploitation by adults. Generally, states create these regimes on a
16
sliding scale. The state institutes an “age of consent,” which
establishes the age at which the law presumes an adolescent is
17
capable of consenting to sexual activity. In North Carolina that age
18
is sixteen years old. In addition, states often create a “peer
exception” to these laws when both parties are minors of similar
15. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25 (reporting that 63.5 percent of seventeenyear-old males and 64.0 percent of seventeen-year-old females have engaged in opposite-sex
sexual contact and that 6.6 percent of seventeen-year-old males and 5.1 percent of seventeenyear-old females have engaged in same-sex sexual contact).
16. The “age of consent” is the “age at which a person may engage in any sexual conduct
permitted to adults within that state.” RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A
GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 44 (1996).
17. CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2004) (“Those ‘under age’ are deemed incapable of giving valid consent to
[sexual] activity.”); see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 44–64 (collecting a fiftystate survey of age-of-consent laws).
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (2000) (criminalizing sexual activity between a minor
under the age of sixteen and an adult more than five years older than the minor).
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19

ages. In North Carolina, for example, it is lawful for a minor under
sixteen years old to engage in sexual contact with another minor
20
when the difference of their ages is within three years. According to
a state official in Kansas, one rationale for this sliding-scale exception
is that “it is impossible to identify which child is the victim and which
21
is the perpetrator.”
This discussion is not meant to oversimplify the law concerning
the sexual activity of adolescents. These laws “def[y] easy
22
characterization.” In every state, the law differs on several policy
choices: the age of participants, the types of activities the statute
covers, the penalties for violations, whether minor participants of the
same age are prosecuted, and what maximum range of ages still
23
satisfies the peer exception if it does exist.
Further complicating the law governing adolescent sexuality,
age-of-consent statutes do not singularly protect the sexual wellbeing
of minors. In addition to establishing complex regimes regulating
teenage sexuality, many states have historically prohibited certain
24
forms of sexual activity among adults and minors alike. For example,
since the reign of Henry VIII, the law has prohibited crimes against
25
nature regardless of the age of its participants. Many American
states, including North Carolina, have maintained this tradition,
interpreting this prohibition of sodomy to forbid any form of sexual
26
activity other than vaginal intercourse. This prohibition can even
27
include oral sex between heterosexual couples. Before Lawrence,

19. See, e.g., id. § 14.202.2 (criminalizing sexual activity between a minor under the age of
sixteen and another minor more than three years older).
20. Id.
21. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099 (D. Kan. 2006). Not all states
agree with this exception. Illinois concluded that when two underage minors have sex, “each is
the victim of the other” and can be prosecuted. In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) (interpreting title 720, section 5/12-15 of the Illinois Code, which contains no peer
exception).
22. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW
142 (2d ed. 2004).
23. COCCA, supra note 17, at 2.
24. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (criminalizing fornication and adultery).
25. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 n.5 (1986) (tracing the origins of North
Carolina’s sodomy statute to a statute passed under Henry VIII); see also POSNER & SILBAUGH,
supra note 16, at 65 (tracing the source of the criminalization of sodomy to the era of Henry
VIII and to even older church law).
26. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 65–71 (collecting a fifty-state survey of
sodomy laws and noting the lack of a uniform definition of sodomy).
27. Id. at 65.
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because sodomy was illegal for anyone in these states, courts applied
age-of-consent laws alongside the prohibition on sodomy, which
created a bifurcated approach to regulating the wellbeing of minors:
an adolescent’s participation in vaginal intercourse could be lawful
because it did not violate the age-of-consent law even though that
28
same adolescent’s participation in oral sex was unlawful.
Until 2003, the constitutionality of this bifurcated framework
seemed well established because the Supreme Court had upheld the
29
prohibition of sodomy in its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
Under Bowers, the same rule applied to adults and minors: vaginal
30
intercourse was legal when oral sex was not. The Supreme Court
revisited the sodomy issue in 2003, however. In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Texas statute that only
31
prohibited sexual activity between members of the same sex. The
Court ruled that the petitioners were “free as adults to engage in [oral
sex] in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of
32
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.” Lawrence
33
expressly overruled Bowers. It also implied that its holding went
further than merely striking down statutes targeting homosexuality—
Lawrence appears to have invalidated sodomy statutes whether they
34
regulate heterosexual or homosexual couples.
Unfortunately for the lower courts that must apply Lawrence, the
U.S. Supreme Court did not clearly explain the contours of the right it
was recognizing. At the end of the opinion, the Court issued a final,

28. See, e.g., In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (N.C. 2007) (ruling that the state may punish
sodomy between minors as a felony under the general crime-against-nature statute rather than
statutes governing vaginal intercourse between minors). This Note calls this division between
age-of-consent regulation and sodomy prohibitions the “bifurcated approach,” as it regulates
the sexual behavior of minors under two disconnected frameworks.
29. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986) (ruling that general prohibitions
of sodomy did not violate the Due Process Clause).
30. See id. (upholding Georgia’s general prohibition of sodomy). This discussion describes
the system that existed in states that still had sodomy statute. For a fifty-state survey of sodomy
laws, see POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 65–71.
31. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
32. Id. at 564.
33. Id. at 578.
34. The Court implicitly applied its holding to laws affecting heterosexual activity as well as
statutes like the ones before it that prohibited only homosexual activity. See id. at 575 (“Were
we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a
prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between samesex and different-sex participants.”).
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unexplained caveat: “The present case does not involve minors.”
This caveat leaves a curious question: because many states only have
statutes that criminalize sodomy involving minors and adults alike, it
is not immediately clear what effect Lawrence has in cases in which
one or both of the participants is a minor. In other words, has the
bifurcated approach survived Lawrence, or do minors possess some
version of this right under the Constitution?
B. Applying Lawrence to Age-of-Consent Laws
Courts have not resolved how to apply Lawrence to cases
involving minors. Most state appellate decisions on point have only
addressed prosecutions based on statutes specifically prohibiting
sodomy involving minors rather than the general prohibitions on
36
sodomy implicitly struck down in Lawrence. In the summer of 2007,
the supreme courts of North Carolina and Virginia did consider cases
in which minors were prosecuted under general sodomy statues. But
neither decision resolved how Lawrence affects cases involving
minors, because both courts dismissed the constitutional challenge by
taking the caveat regarding minors at face value, holding that because
37
Lawrence did not involve minors, it did not apply to minors.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was the first high court
after Lawrence to consider the constitutionality of prohibiting minors
from engaging in the crime against nature when traditional sexual
activity is lawful. In R.L.C., the court determined that a minor could
be prosecuted for having oral sex with another minor even though
38
their vaginal intercourse was lawful.
35. Id. at 578. The Court made this observation along with several others. The Court
continued,
It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Id.
36. See People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 32–33 (Cal. 2006) (considering a statute punishing
oral sex with a minor more severely than a statute punishing vaginal intercourse with a minor);
Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (considering a statute prohibiting
sodomy specifically between minors that punished the actor more severely than a statute
prohibiting sex between minors); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005) (addressing
statutes that punished homosexual sodomy with minors more severely than traditional sexual
relationships).
37. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 922 (N.C. 2007); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d
918, 921 (Va. 2007).
38. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 921, 923–24.
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When R.L.C. was fourteen years old, he engaged in sexual
39
intercourse and oral sex with O.P.M., his twelve-year-old girlfriend.
Over a year later, while police were questioning O.P.M. about an
unrelated incident, she informed an officer of her sexual history with
40
R.L.C. When confronted, R.L.C. admitted he had engaged in oral
41
sex with O.P.M. “two [or] three times.” Consequently, R.L.C. was
adjudicated a criminal delinquent for committing “the crime against
42
nature.” Significantly, his “crime against nature” was having oral sex
43
with his girlfriend; under state law, his vaginal intercourse with
44
O.P.M. was lawful.
Appealing his prosecution, R.L.C. raised three issues before the
state supreme court: first, under principles of statutory interpretation,
the legislature did not intend to criminalize his conduct; second, the
statute as it was applied to him violated the Due Process Clause; and
third, the “crime-against-nature” statute was facially unconstitutional
45
46
under Lawrence. The high court affirmed his felony conviction.
First, the court concluded that the legislature had intended to treat
sodomy differently than vaginal intercourse and other sexual acts
47
prohibited by the state’s age-of-consent statutes. Second, the court
rejected the as-applied due process challenge. Because R.L.C. did not
claim his asserted privacy right was fundamental, the court conducted
a rational basis review and concluded that the statute was “rationally
related to [the] legitimate government purpose of preventing sexual

39. Id. at 921.
40. Id.
41. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting R.L.C.).
42. Id.
43. See State v. Harward, 142 S.E.2d 691, 692 (N.C. 1965) (defining oral sex as a “crime
against nature”).
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007) (criminalizing, as first-degree
rape, vaginal intercourse between a victim under the age of thirteen and a defendant who “is at
least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1427.4(a)(1) (2000) (criminalizing, as first-degree sexual offense, vaginal intercourse between a
victim under the age of thirteen and a defendant who “is at least 12 years old and is at least four
years older than the victim”); id. § 14-27.7A (criminalizing vaginal intercourse or a sexual act
with a victim who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old when the defendant is at least four
years older than the victim and not married to the victim); id. § 14-202.2(a) (criminalizing
indecent liberties between children when the defendant is under sixteen and the victim is at
least three years younger than the defendant).
45. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 922–24.
46. Id. at 922, 924–25.
47. See id. at 924 (holding that although age-of-consent statutes “did not constrain R.L.C.’s
sexual activity in this instance[,] . . . . the crime against nature statute did”).
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48

conduct between minors.” The court did not directly address the
third issue, whether North Carolina’s statute was facially
unconstitutional after Lawrence, because R.L.C. had not properly
49
preserved the facial challenge for appeal.
The Supreme Court of Virginia echoed the reasoning of the
50
North Carolina court a month later.
In McDonald v.
Commonwealth, the court determined that the state could prosecute
an adult on felony sodomy charges for having oral sex with sixteenand seventeen-year-old girls, even though vaginal intercourse with
51
them was only a misdemeanor. William McDonald was in his
midforties when he engaged in separate incidents of “sexual
intercourse and oral sodomy” with two girls, ages sixteen and
52
seventeen. McDonald was convicted of four counts of sodomy under
53
a Virginia law prohibiting oral sex. McDonald appealed his
54
conviction, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court of Virginia.
McDonald argued that Virginia law, properly interpreted, did
not criminalize his conduct and that the sodomy statute was
55
unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court of
Virginia, however, rejected McDonald’s statutory construction.
McDonald observed that one statute prohibited any sexual contact
with minors under fifteen and another prohibited only “sexual
56
intercourse” between an adult and a minor fifteen years old or older;
he contended that, together, these statutes set the age of consent for
sexual activity other than vaginal intercourse at fifteen years old,
57
making his conduct lawful. The court disagreed, determining that
the statutes created a bifurcated approach that permitted the state to
58
prosecute sodomy without regard to the age-of-consent statutes.

48. Id. at 924–25.
49. Id. at 922.
50. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918, 921, 923–24 (Va. 2007).
51. Id. at 919, 923–24.
52. Id. at 919.
53. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (2004 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting anyone from
“carnally know[ing] any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth”).
54. McDonald, 645 S.E.2d at 919, 921.
55. Id. at 921.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.
57. McDonald, 645 S.E.2d at 923.
58. See id. at 923–24 (holding that the sodomy statute applied to sexual conduct by minors
irrespective of age-of-consent statutes).
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Like North Carolina, the Virginia court did not consider the
facial challenge to the statute’s constitutionality, finding that the
59
defendant had not preserved the argument for appeal. Although the
Virginia court did address the as-applied challenge, it did so in the
same cursory fashion as its counterpart in R.L.C. According to the
court, because Lawrence observed that “[t]he present case does not
60
involve minors,” “[n]othing in Lawrence . . . prohibits the application
61
of the sodomy statute to conduct between adults and minors.” Thus,
Virginia may constitutionally punish sodomy with a minor more
62
aggressively than vaginal intercourse with a minor.
Both North Carolina and Virginia preserved the longstanding
bifurcated approach to regulating the sexual activity of minors, which
treats traditional and nontraditional sexual activity differently. This
bifurcation leads to a seemingly absurd result: in North Carolina, two
minors may lawfully have vaginal intercourse, but they are felons if
they have oral sex until reaching maturity—when Lawrence and the
63
Due Process Clause protect their privacy. Likewise, gay and lesbian
adolescents endure a more restrictive age of consent in practice
because they may not engage in any sexual activity until they reach
the age of majority, when North Carolina and Virginia are forced to
recognize their rights under Lawrence.
This result is unconstitutional, however, because Lawrence
teaches that singling out the nontraditional sexuality of adolescents
when they may lawfully engage in vaginal intercourse violates their
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. To reach this
conclusion, one must first consider exactly what protections Lawrence
articulated, which Section C addresses. Second, one must recognize
the broader context of minors’ rights under the Constitution, which
exist in tension with the state’s special powers to protect minors. Part
II presents this analysis.

59. Id. at 921.
60. Id. at 924 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 923 (“[T]he sodomy statute stands alone and without age restrictions
concerning consent.”).
63. See In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 923–25 (N.C. 2007) (enforcing the state’s sodomy
statute against a teen for engaging in oral sex when he could have lawfully engaged in vaginal
intercourse).
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C. Defining the Scope of Lawrence’s Holding
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas has been
64
described as “famously obtuse.” Lawrence held that Texas’s
prohibition of sodomy between members of the same sex was
unconstitutional. Beyond this decision, exactly what the Court
65
concluded is less clear.
First, the Lawrence Court failed to explain whether its holding is
limited to laws and conduct targeting homosexuals or whether it
protects heterosexual conduct as well. Lawrence suggests that the
Supreme Court intended to strike down all prohibitions of sodomy as
a violation of the right to privacy. Had the Court not intended this
result, Lawrence would have relied on the Equal Protection Clause
rather than the Due Process Clause. In her concurring opinion,
Justice O’Connor argued that the Texas statute, which prohibited
only same-sex sodomy, violated only the Equal Protection Clause by
66
targeting homosexuals. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
disagreed: “Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would
be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both
67
between same-sex and different-sex participants.”
Additionally, the majority overruled precedent upholding
general sodomy laws. Justice O’Connor favored relying on the Equal
Protection Clause to avoid conflicting with the Court’s prior decision
68
in Bowers v. Hardwick, which had held that general sodomy statutes
69
do not violate homosexuals’ due process privacy rights. The
Lawrence majority, however, expressly overruled Bowers, holding

64. Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862,
1868 (2006).
65. See id. (“Lawrence’s incontrovertible result was that Texas’s prohibition on same-sex
sodomy violated the Due Process Clause, and that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrong, both in
methodology and in outcome, the day it was decided. Lawrence is otherwise famously obtuse.”).
66. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 575 (majority opinion).
68. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
69. See id. at 190–91 (1986) (ruling that general prohibitions on sodomy do not violate the
Due Process Clause). The difference in the treatment of homosexuals can be seen within the
statutes themselves. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)(1) (2007) (“A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (“A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” (emphasis added)), invalidated by
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
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that prohibitions on sodomy—whether or not they were limited to
homosexual conduct—violated a liberty interest protected by the Due
70
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
did not need to overrule Bowers if it merely intended to grant
Lawrence relief from the Texas statute as applied to him because it
could have done so on equal protection grounds. Therefore, by
relying on the Due Process Clause, the best interpretation of
Lawrence’s majority opinion is that the Supreme Court held that the
due process right to privacy protects all nontraditional sexuality from
the scrutiny of the state, rather than just homosexual relationships.
The majority opinion failed to articulate, however, whether the
71
recognized right should be considered fundamental. Though the
Court relied on its privacy-rights jurisprudence, and the Court
historically has treated privacy as a fundamental right and applied
strict scrutiny, the Lawrence Court focused its discussion on the right
of the state to regulate morality, an interest typically subject to
72
rational basis review. By holding that the state’s asserted interest in
morality was insufficient, it is possible the Court applied some form of
73
heightened review. The question remains unresolved.
Some have read Lawrence as articulating a fundamental right. In
his essay on Lawrence, for example, Professor Tribe claims the Court
established a fundamental substantive due process right protecting
74
gay and lesbian relationships that warrants strict scrutiny. Though
the Court failed to expressly articulate the level of scrutiny, he argues,
“[t]he practice of announcing such a standard . . . is of relatively
recent vintage . . . and has not shown itself worthy of being enshrined
75
as a permanent fixture in the armament of constitutional analysis.”
According to Tribe, “the strictness of the Court’s standard” is
“obvious” because of both what the Court did and what the Court

70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
71. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 846 (3d
ed. 2006) (“[T]he Court in Lawrence did not articulate the level of scrutiny to be used.”).
72. Id. This reading of Lawrence has been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. See Williams v.
Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying rational basis review to Alabama’s
ban on the sale of “sex toys” and the concomitant burden on an individual’s ability to use the
devices).
73. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 846 (discussing the confusion over Lawrence’s
standard of review and citing other scholarship discussing its meaning).
74. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916–17 (2004).
75. Id.
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76

said. First, the Court relied on precedents such as Griswold v.
77
78
Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, in which the Court explicitly applied
79
strict scrutiny. Second, the Court “invoked the talismanic verbal
formula of substantive due process” throughout the opinion, albeit
with the words in a different order: for example, the Court declared
that the case addressed the “‘protection of liberty under the Due
Process Clause [that] has a substantive dimension of fundamental
80
significance in defining the rights of the person.’”
If this reading by Professor Tribe and others is correct, then, and
Lawrence does create a fundamental right, what is the nature of that
liberty interest? For Professor Tribe, the right is one to be free from
having the state “stigmatiz[e] . . . intimate personal relationships
81
between people of the same sex.” According to him, the Court held
that individuals have a liberty interest in engaging in sodomy, like
other forms of nonprocreative sexual activity, because sexual conduct
82
“can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”
The Court’s focus was on the relationship aspect of the constitutional
question: “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
83
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.” Tribe
goes on to explain why Lawrence was about more than a prohibition
of same-sex sodomy: society has conflated sodomy with
homosexuality, and therefore any prohibition on sodomy, even a
prohibition on sodomy between opposite-sex couples, is an invitation
84
to stigmatize and demean the relationships of homosexuals.
Professor Tribe does not present his views as the definitive
interpretation of Lawrence. Many commentators have concluded that
the Lawrence right to liberty is fundamental, though using different

76. Id. at 1917.
77. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79. See id. at 155 (“Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
80. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1916–17 (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003)).
81. Id. at 1904.
82. Id. at 1904–05 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
83. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
84. Tribe, supra note 74, at 1906.
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85

reasoning. Still others, however, disagree that Lawrence articulated
a fundamental right in the first place.
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has taken this view. In Lofton
86
v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether to apply Lawrence to a Florida
87
law prohibiting a homosexual couple from adopting children. The
court concluded that Lawrence did not create a fundamental right to
sexual privacy that would trigger strict scrutiny. Of most significance
to the court was that Lawrence had applied only rational basis review,
rather than strict scrutiny, which would have been required had the
88
Court considered the liberty fundamental. In addition, the Eleventh
Circuit held the Lawrence opinion failed to apply the “two primary
89
features” of fundamental-rights inquiries that the Supreme Court
90
established in Washington v. Glucksberg. In Glucksberg, the Court
held that the test of whether an asserted right is fundamental is
91
whether it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
92
and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” In addition, to
recognize such a right as fundamental, the Court must provide a
93
“careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”
According to the Eleventh Circuit, Lawrence did not satisfy either of
these requirements, and therefore the asserted right was not
94
fundamental.
Regardless of whether Lawrence articulates a fundamental right,
however, the Court did recognize some form of right based on
substantive due process. In addition, whatever the nature of that
liberty, the right is one that trumps the state’s interests in promoting
traditional notions of morality.

85. See Greene, supra note 64, at 1868–75 (discussing various scholarly interpretations of
Lawrence and arguing the Court recognized a fundamental right to autonomy when making
status-defining decisions).
86. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 806.
88. Id. at 817 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
89. Id. at 816.
90. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
91. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977)).
92. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
93. Id.
94. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
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This was the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Reliable
95
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle. In Reliable Consultants, the court
considered whether to apply Lawrence to a Texas statute prohibiting
96
the sale of sex toys. Texas argued that Lawrence did not apply
because the case was limited to statutes that target a specific class of
people, such as homosexuals. The court disagreed with such a narrow
reading, holding the Supreme Court’s decision to rely on due process
97
rather than equal protection indicated the right was much broader.
According to the court, “The right [Lawrence] recognized was . . . a
right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the most
98
private human contact, sexual behavior.’” On that reading,
Lawrence established a right for all people, both gay and straight, to
99
engage in private intimate conduct free from government intrusion.
The Fifth Circuit also explained that how the Supreme Court had
phrased the constitutional question in Lawrence reinforced its
conclusion that the Court’s focus was on protecting privacy rather
100
than conduct. It observed that the Lawrence Court must have found
a right to sexual privacy because the question presented considered
whether “convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy” violate
due process.
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the question presented in
Lawrence makes even more sense when compared with the question
presented in Bowers. Indeed, the main difference between Bowers
and Lawrence is not the answer those opinions delivered but the
101
questions those Courts answered. In Bowers, the Court somewhat
facetiously addressed the question “whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in

95. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that in
Lawrence “[t]he Court expressly rejected the State’s rationale by adopting Justice Stevens’ view
in Bowers as ‘controlling’ and quoting Justice Stevens’ statement that ‘the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice’” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
577–78)).
96. Id. at 740–41.
97. Id. at 744.
98. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564).
99. Id. Before reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit considered and disagreed with the
Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Lawrence did not recognize a right to sexual privacy. Id. at
743 n.23, 745 n.33.
100. Id. at 744. Professor Tribe makes a similar argument. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1900.
101. Tribe, supra note 74, at 1899–900.
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sodomy.” The answer to that question was implied in its form—the
Constitution does not address sexuality at all. In Lawrence, however,
the Court framed the question differently: “Whether petitioners’
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due
103
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In the Lawrence
formulation, the question focused entirely on the intimacy of the
activity without mentioning the particular form of that intimacy. For
the Supreme Court, it was irrelevant whether the state was attempting
to punish oral sex or vaginal intercourse between consenting parties.
Because the form of sexual expression was irrelevant to the Court’s
constitutional analysis, the best interpretation of Lawrence is that it
recognizes constitutional protection for private, intimate
104
relationships.
Though it recognized that the Lawrence court had established a
right to sexual privacy, the Fifth Circuit also acknowledged that the
105
Supreme Court left unresolved whether that right is fundamental.
The Fifth Circuit held it was not necessary to resolve this question,
however, because the Supreme Court had expressly recognized the
right, whether it is fundamental or otherwise, and the Court had
“carefully delineated the types of governmental interest that are
constitutionally insufficient to sustain a law that infringes on this
106
substantive due process right.” Principal among those insufficient
107
interests was the state’s interest in promoting morality.
108
As the Fifth Circuit observed, by adopting Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, Lawrence held that moral aversion
toward sodomy does not justify states infringing individuals’ rights to
109
sexual privacy. In Bowers Justice Stevens had argued that “the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
110
a law prohibiting the practice.” Revisiting the issue in Lawrence, the
Court quoted Justice Stevens and then held that “Justice Stevens’
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
Tribe, supra note 74, at 1899–900.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and
111
should control here.” In the next sentence, the Court expressly
112
overruled Bowers. Thus, the Court reversed itself and endorsed
Justice Stevens’s view that morality is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify prohibiting sodomy.
Without reaching the fundamental rights question, the Fifth
Circuit’s view of Lawrence supports the conclusion that Lawrence
created at least some right to sexual privacy, and the state may not
infringe this right unless it has some reason other than moral
aversion. This view also supports the conclusion that R.L.C. and
McDonald were wrongly decided: singling out the nontraditional
sexuality of adolescents when they may lawfully engage in vaginal
intercourse violates their liberty interest just as much as it violates the
interests of adults. To reach this conclusion, one must consider
Lawrence in the broader context of the tension that exists between
the special powers of the state to protect minors on the one hand and
minors’ substantive due process rights on the other.
II. MINORS, THE STATE, AND SODOMY
Minors’ constitutional rights exist in tension with the state’s
special powers to regulate minors’ affairs. On one hand, in In re
113
Gault the Supreme Court famously announced that “neither the
114
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”
In a case that served as the foundation of much of the jurisprudence
concerning the nature of minors’ rights in comparison to the rights of
adults, the Court held that adolescent defendants have the same basic
115
constitutional protections as adult defendants during criminal trials.
This fundamental premise that minors have constitutional rights has
led the Court to assert other rights of minors, including certain rights
116
to freedom of speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and

111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
112. Id.
113. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 33–34, 41, 55, 57. For a discussion of how In re Gault has served as a foundation
of the jurisprudence of the rights of minors and the history of minors’ rights overall, see Chad
M. Gerson, The Abortion Rights of Adolescents Should Be Coextensive with Those of Adults: A
Theoretical Framework, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 443, 454–58 (2006).
116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).
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117

seizures, and the right to due process when facing suspension from
118
school.
On the other hand, under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state
can protect minors even when doing so would violate the rights of
119
adults. Ordinarily, the state regulates the activities of adults under
its police power. The doctrine of parens patriae, however, gives the
state additional authority to regulate minors. The Supreme Court has
justified this enhanced power of the state on three grounds: (1) the
peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) minors’ inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and (3) the importance of
120
parents in child rearing. Thus, minors share the constitutional rights
adults enjoy, but the state can infringe those rights for reasons not
sufficient for adults. For example, the state can constitutionally
establish the age at which minors may lawfully engage in sexual
121
activity.
This Note argues, however, that when it comes to prohibiting
nontraditional sexual activity in a context in which traditional sexual
activity is legal, the state does not have any interest under either
parens patriae or its inherent police power to forbid nontraditional
sexual activity. Once the state determines that minors are capable of
giving their consent to engage in traditional forms of sexual contact,
prohibiting oral sex between the minors violates their liberty rights
under the Due Process Clause.
This Part explains why the privacy rights of minors protect them
from prosecution for sodomy when traditional sexuality is legal.
Section A demonstrates that the Supreme Court has held that minors
enjoy the same privacy rights as adults unless the government has a
significant interest in protecting minors that does not exist for adults.
Because the state does not have an interest in prohibiting minors
from engaging in some kinds of sexual contact but not others, Section
A argues that courts should extend Lawrence to protect the rights of

117. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–38 (1985).
118. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
119. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 14–16 (3d ed. 2007).
120. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
121. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) (“[S]exual exploitation of
children is a particularly pernicious evil that sometimes may be concealed behind the zone of
privacy that normally shields the home . . . . The state unquestionably has a very compelling
interest in preventing such conduct.” (alteration in original) (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So.
2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1991))).
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minors. Section B analyzes the state’s interest in regulating the sexual
activity of minors. It concludes that, after Lawrence, a state’s interest
in prohibiting minors from engaging in oral sex is no greater than its
interest in prohibiting minors from engaging in vaginal intercourse,
requiring the state to regulate the two activities equally. Section C
bolsters this conclusion, arguing that other courts have rejected the
state’s interest in preserving morality when deciding minors’ rights
under equal protection claims rather than due process challenges.
Finally, Section D contends that the North Carolina and Virginia high
courts improperly interpreted how the Due Process Clause applies to
the rights of minors who engage in nontraditional sexual activities.
A. The Liberty Interests of Minors Engaging in Sexual Activity
Lawrence v. Texas held that adults enjoy a liberty interest in
122
choosing the form of their sexual expression. Although the Court
123
also stated that the case “d[id] not involve minors,” Lawrence does
not rule out extending this right to minors. In cases addressing the
rights of minors, the Supreme Court has consistently held that minors
enjoy rights similar to those of adults absent a unique state interest.
Examining the Lawrence Court’s caveat in context shows that
Lawrence did not necessarily depart from this basic principle.
1. The Other Caveats. The R.L.C. and McDonald courts
contended that the Court’s caveat about minors preserves the
124
prohibition of sodomy between minors, but that interpretation is
not the only plausible one. The caveat may have only meant that the
general right to sexual privacy—which Lawrence found the Due
Process Clause confers—did not affect other statutes regulating the
age at which minors can lawfully engage in sexual activity. In other
words, Justice Kennedy perhaps was explaining that the general right
to sexual privacy did not prohibit a state from enacting age-of-consent

122. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The State cannot demean [gay
people’s] existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government.”); see also supra Part I.C.
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
124. See In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 925 (N.C. 2007) (“Lawrence is distinguishable from
the instant case by the very language of Lawrence. . . . This juvenile case does involve minors.”);
McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918, 924 (Va. 2007) (emphasizing the Lawrence
opinion’s caveat that its holding did not apply to minors in the Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision to uphold applying the state’s sodomy law to the defendant).
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statutes generally, rather than saying that a state may forbid sodomy
between minors.
Comparing the caveat concerning minors with other caveats in
the Lawrence opinion strengthens this interpretation, as Justice
Kennedy included these other caveats in the same paragraph and
125
used parallel sentence construction. In addition to minors, the Court
noted that the case in Lawrence did not involve rape, prostitution, or
126
same-sex marriage. But these legal concerns are unrelated to
sodomy laws. Rape and prostitution were not prosecuted as sodomy,
127
either at common law or under modern penal codes. Same-sex
marriage is an entirely separate constitutional question, not a criminal
offense. Thus, Justice Kennedy may have intended the caveat
paragraph to guide the right of sexual privacy in the context of other
laws rather than preserve the Texas statute, and general sodomy laws
for application to factually different situations. Regardless of how this
caveat is to be interpreted, however, the Court itself acknowledged it
128
is only a statement of dicta, because the case did not involve minors.
Therefore, the caveat should not be interpreted to single-handedly
deny minors any liberty interest in sexual privacy, which would depart
129
from other Supreme Court precedent.
2. The Privacy Rights of Minors in Other Contexts. Supreme
Court precedent existing before Lawrence indicates that minors enjoy
a right to privacy similar to, though not as extensive as, the right to
privacy adults hold. The Court asserted as much in both Planned
130
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth and Carey v. Population

125. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does
not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
126. Id.
127. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 5–34, 155–87 (describing the regulatory
approach of all fifty states to issues of rape, sexual assault, and prostitution). Prosecutors
occasionally bring sodomy charges instead of traditional rape and prostitution charges to
increase potential penalties, but these cases are really prosecuting the underlying conduct—rape
or prostitution—not the crime against nature itself. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233,
1237–38 (La. 2005) (upholding a felony conviction for committing the crime against nature when
the state could have charged the defendant with prostitution, a misdemeanor).
128. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
129. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (establishing a three-part test to
determine when minors’ rights are less than those adults enjoy).
130. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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131

Services International, which addressed minors’ rights to obtain
abortions and contraception. In Danforth, the Supreme Court held
that a state may not create a parental veto over a minor child’s
132
decision to have an abortion.
According to the Court,
“[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
133
constitutional rights.” Although the Court noted that “the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than
of adults,” the law would only be constitutional if “there is any
significant state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of
a parent or person in loco parentis that is not present in the case of an
134
adult.” Concluding the state lacked such an interest, the Court held
135
the requirement of parental consent was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court applied this “unique significant interest”
standard to a minor’s right to privacy again in Carey v. Population
Services International, in which the Court considered a statute that
prohibited distributing contraceptives to minors under the age of
136
sixteen. In a series of fractured opinions, the Court concluded that
completely denying minors access to contraception was
137
unconstitutional. Six Justices reached this conclusion by applying a
test similar to the “unique significant interest” test articulated in
138
Danforth. According to the plurality, “the right to privacy in
131. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality opinion). For a
summary of the Justices’ positions in Carey, see infra note 137.
132. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 74–75.
135. Id. at 75.
136. Carey, 431 U.S. at 681. The statute provided that only pharmacists could distribute
contraceptives and could not distribute them to minors. Id.
137. See id. at 694–95 (expressing the view of four Justices that the state lacked a significant
interest in burdening minors’ rights to privacy by preventing minors from obtaining
contraceptives); id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (expressing
the view that the statute did not “measurably contribute[]” to the state’s offered justification of
deterring minors’ sexual activity); id. at 707–08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (expressing the view that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to minors
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen who were lawfully married but could not exercise their
right to privacy within that marital relationship); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (expressing the view that the statute did not contribute to the
state’s asserted interest of deterring minors’ sexual activity).
138. For a description of the opinions of the four-Justice plurality, the opinion of Justice
White, and the opinion of Justice Stevens, as well as a summary of their views, see supra note
137.
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connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as
139
well as to adults.” These four Justices concluded that minors’ rights
to privacy include a right to access contraception because adults have
that privacy right and the state had failed to identify a significant state
interest that justified infringing a fundamental right to protect
140
minors. Though the remaining two Justices did not agree minors
have a fundamental right to access contraceptives, they did apply the
same Danforth “significant interest” test the plurality used when
concluding the statute was unconstitutional under rational basis
141
review.
Thus, under these two Supreme Court cases, minors enjoy the
same rights to privacy as adults when making procreation decisions.
Minors share this privacy right with adults because the government
lacks a “significant state interest . . . that is not present in the case of
142
an adult.” It should be noted, however, that this standard is less
stringent than the one applied to burdens on adults’ fundamental
rights. Based on the state’s power under parens patriae, state action
only needs to survive the “significant state interest” test rather than
the “compelling state interest test” courts usually apply to adults’
143
privacy rights. This less stringent standard is in deference to the
state’s role as protector and in light of the particular vulnerability of
children. After Lawrence, however, the state does not have an
interest in singling out nontraditional sexual activity, even under the
doctrine of parens patriae. Therefore, based on the theory of
modeling minors’ rights to privacy on the rights of adults Danforth
and Carey articulate, the protections of Lawrence should be extended
to minors.

139. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.
140. Id. at 693–96. Though the plurality concluded minors have a right to contraceptives, the
plurality declined to rule on the larger question of whether minors have a right “to engage in
private consensual sexual behavior.” Id. at 694 n.17.
141. Justices White and Stevens appear to have applied rational basis review to the statute
because they concluded the state lacked any interest to support the statute while simultaneously
concluding the statute did not infringe a fundamental right of minors. Id. at 702 (White, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the result); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 137.
142. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
143. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.
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B. The State’s Interest in Singling out Nontraditional Sexuality
In the case of a right to sexual privacy, the state’s interest in
prohibiting sodomy is no greater than its interest in prohibiting
minors from engaging in traditional sexual activity. As Part I.C
discussed, Lawrence held that the government’s interest in promoting
morality by itself does not justify infringing the due process liberty
144
interest in sexual privacy. Although the state has an important
interest in regulating the sexual activity of minor children, the state
has no interest in singling out nontraditional sexual activity.
Therefore, the age of consent should be the same for both.
The state does have an interest in regulating the sexual behaviors
145
of adolescents. A state may constitutionally regulate the age of
consent of its minor children by criminalizing their sexual activity to
146
protect them from injury. Age-of-consent laws are constitutional
because they meet the “unique significant interest” standard—the
state can decide that minors lack the maturity to give adequate
consent, and so the state has a significant interest in protecting minors
147
from harm.
This extremely significant state interest does not transfer,
however, to regulating the form of sexual expression that takes place
in a setting that the state has deemed otherwise safe for the minor. By
allowing the minor to engage in vaginal intercourse, North Carolina
effectively concedes that those minors are capable of giving their
consent. Unlike age-of-consent laws, sodomy laws are justified solely
on the basis of morality, which Lawrence deemed an insufficient state
148
interest. Because morality is an interest “present in the case of an

144. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
145. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.17 (declining to decide whether minors have an
independent right to sexual privacy that would prohibit all government regulation).
146. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (counseling “against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury
to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects” (emphasis added)).
147. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74–75 (defining the test as whether “there is any significant
state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis
that is not present in the case of an adult”); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN
TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 125–26 (2004) (“The
justification for adult punishment—the exploitation of the young—is missing from settings in
which both participants are young.”); Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent
Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 315
(2003) (“The justification usually put forward for age of consent laws is the protection of young
persons from sexual exploitation by adults.”).
148. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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adult,” unless the state can identify some other reason, such as
evidence that prohibiting sodomy protects minors from injury, then
Danforth and Carey suggest minors should possess a right to sexual
privacy coextensive with adults.
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized these dual
interests of the state—protecting minors from injury and safeguarding
149
their morality. In B.B. v. State, the court determined that the state’s
interest in preventing adult sexual exploitation trumps the minor’s
right to privacy under the state constitution but the state’s interest in
150
safeguarding morality does not. In B.B., a sixteen-year-old was
charged with a felony for having vaginal intercourse with another
sixteen-year-old under a statute punishing intercourse with a person
151
less than eighteen years old who was of “previous chaste character.”
According to the court, the Florida state constitution confers privacy
rights on both adults and minors, which include a right to sexual
152
privacy. Therefore, the court considered whether “the statute
furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive
153
means.” Searching for a state interest in the minor-minor context,
the court said the statute was “designed to protect the youth of
[Florida] . . . from the initial violation of their actual condition of
154
sexual chastity.”
In other words, the state’s interest was
safeguarding the morality of minors. The court determined, however,
that adjudicating minors as delinquents was not “the least intrusive
155
means of furthering . . . the State’s compelling interest.” Thus, the
156
statute violated B.B.’s constitutional right to sexual privacy.
Concededly, the court did not conclude morality could never justify
state action, even in the context of privacy rights; it only determined
that morality was not a sufficient interest to justify criminalizing an
157
activity in which the minor has a privacy interest. This conclusion is
149. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
150. Id. at 259–60.
151. Id. at 257–58.
152. Id. at 259.
153. Id. (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989)).
154. Id. (quoting Deas v. State, 161 So. 729, 730 (Fla. 1935) (per curiam)).
155. Id.
156. The Florida Supreme Court was analyzing B.B.’s right to privacy under the Florida
Constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 257. The Florida court’s analysis
nevertheless assists this Note’s argument because the court addressed the state’s interests in
regulating the sexual behavior of minors.
157. See id. at 260 (“At present, we will not debate morality in respect to the statute or
debate whether this century-old statute fits within the contemporary ‘facts of life.’”).
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not that far from the conclusion in Lawrence, which did not
158
completely deny the existence of a state interest in morality either;
rather, Lawrence held it was not a sufficient interest to justify
159
burdening the right to sexual privacy.
The Florida court’s analysis distinguishing regulation based on
morality from regulation based on potential injury is instructive. The
B.B. court emphasized this difference by explaining its earlier
160
decision in Jones v. State,
which considered a statute that
161
criminalized sexual activity between an adult and a minor. As the
B.B. court explained, in Jones, the court had held that the privacy
rights of minors “do not vitiate the legislature’s efforts to protect
minors from the conduct of others. ‘Sexual exploitation of children is
a particularly pernicious evil that sometimes may be concealed
behind the zone of privacy . . . . The state unquestionably has a very
162
compelling interest in preventing such conduct.’”
In B.B. and Jones, therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida
recognized two possible state interests in regulating the sexuality of
minors. First, the state could have an interest in protecting children
from harm or injury from the sexual exploitation of adults. The
Florida court held that this interest is sufficient to overcome minors’
163
rights to sexual privacy. Second, the state could have an interest in
safeguarding the morality of minors. The Supreme Court of Florida
determined, however, that preserving morality is not a sufficient
164
reason to criminalize sexual activity between minors.
These two interests are also applicable to the privacy interests of
minors engaging in nontraditional sexual activity. Age-of-consent
laws serve states’ legitimate interests in protecting minors from
exploitation. Once the state has determined that the minors are not in
danger and may engage in vaginal intercourse, however, the state can
no longer assert its interest to prevent the minor from choosing
nontraditional forms of sexual activity such as oral sex. To do so

158. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 n.36 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Our
holding in no way overtly expresses or implies that public morality can never be a constitutional
justification for a law. We merely hold that after Lawrence it is not a constitutional justification
for [the statute outlawing selling sex toys].”).
159. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
160. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
161. Id. at 1086.
162. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259 (quoting Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1086).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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would allow the state to assert its interest in promoting morality over
minors’ interests in privacy by criminalizing their conduct. Both the
Lawrence and B.B. decisions counsel against this result.
In sum, the Due Process Clause permits the state to regulate
minors’ nontraditional sexual activity only to the degree it regulates
traditional forms of sexual expression. Although the state has an
interest in protecting minors from harms premature sexual activity
causes generally, it has no additional interests in the context of oral
sex. Courts should interpret the Constitution to require the law to
treat both traditional and nontraditional forms equally, moral
aversion notwithstanding.
C. The State’s Interest and Equal Protection
The equal protection jurisprudence that has emerged based on
Lawrence bolsters the conclusion that the state lacks a significant
enough interest to justify singling out nontraditional sexual activity
among minors. Though Lawrence was decided under the Due Process
Clause, several state high courts have extended its analysis to
conclude that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from
165
punishing different types of sexual contact differently. These cases
support the view that minors have a due process right to engage in
nontraditional sexual activity when the state approves of their
participation in traditional forms of sexual behavior.
166
In State v. Limon, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from punishing acts of
sodomy with minors more severely than acts of traditional sexual
167
activity. In Limon, a male, one week past his eighteenth birthday,
was convicted of engaging in oral sex with another male who was only
168
fifteen. Under Kansas law, a sentence for sexual activity with a
minor was fifteen times longer when the minor was of the same sex
169
than with a minor of the opposite sex. The court applied rational

165. See, e.g., People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 41–42 (Cal. 2006) (concluding that requiring
a defendant convicted of oral sex with a minor to register as a sex offender when he would not
have had to do so if convicted of vaginal intercourse with a minor violated equal protection
under the U.S. Constitution). But see State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1237–38 (La. 2005)
(holding solicitation for sodomy could be constitutionally punished more severely than
solicitation for vaginal intercourse).
166. State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 24.
169. Id. at 29.

ALLENDER IN FINAL FINAL.DOC

2009]

5/5/2009 4:34:08 PM

APPLYING LAWRENCE

1851

basis review to this grossly differential treatment, calling on the state
to demonstrate a legitimate governmental interest rationally related
170
to imposing a longer sentence on Limon’s conduct. The state
maintained it had multiple legitimate state interests that would
withstand rational basis review: specifically, preserving traditional
sexual mores, preserving historical notions of appropriate adolescent
sexual development, protecting adolescents from coercive
relationships, and protecting adolescents from the health risks of
171
sexual activity. The court rejected each of these arguments.
The Limon court quoted Lawrence, holding that “[t]he fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
172
prohibiting the practice.” The court said both preserving sexual
mores and preserving historical notions of appropriate adolescent
sexual development were justifications expressing mere “moral
disapproval,” which could not justify punishing this conduct
173
criminally. In addition, the court could find no evidence or
legislative findings that sexual activity with a minor of the same sex
was any more coercive or carried any greater risks to a minor’s health
174
than did the same conduct with a minor of the opposite sex. Finding
no rational basis to support the disproportionate sentence for the
same conduct, the court held that the Kansas law violated the Equal
175
Protection Clause. Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that
the state lacks a sufficient interest to justify treating traditional and
nontraditional sexual activity differently.
Kansas is not the only state high court to conclude that punishing
nontraditional sexual activity more harshly than traditional activity
176
violates equal protection principles. In People v. Hofsheier, the
Supreme Court of California also addressed this question. In that
case, a twenty-two-year-old male was convicted of engaging in oral
177
sex with a sixteen-year-old. Though California law at the time
required anyone convicted of such an offense to register for life as a
sex offender, California curiously did not require lifetime registration
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 34.
Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 38.
People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 32.
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for persons convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the disproportionate
179
punishment for oral sex denied him equal protection of the law.
The Hofsheier court first considered whether two or more groups
180
of similarly situated persons existed.
Rejecting the state’s
contention that people convicted of different crimes were not similar,
the court concluded that “[t]he only difference between the two
181
offenses is the nature of the sexual act.” The court applied rational
basis review to the equal protection claim because it did not implicate
a suspect class or fundamental right, considering whether the
government had any legitimate interest in preserving this disparate
182
treatment. The Supreme Court of California concluded that the
state has no interest to support disparate punishments for oral sex
183
with a minor versus sexual intercourse with a minor. In other words,
California reached the same conclusion as Kansas: the state lacks an
interest in treating nontraditional sexual activity differently than
traditional sexual activity.
D. Seeking the State’s Interest in R.L.C.
The situations in R.L.C. and McDonald are comparable to those
the supreme courts of Kansas and California considered. Though the
California and Kansas cases relied on equal protection rather than the
due process issue raised in R.L.C. and McDonald, all four cases
sought to identify a state interest to weigh against the right being
infringed. The underlying rationale of Lawrence shows that under
either due process or equal protection review, the state lacks a
significant enough interest to justify singling out nontraditional sexual
activity.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina attempted to discern the
government’s interests in prohibiting sodomy between minors when
vaginal intercourse is lawful. According to the court, the government
had an “interest in preventing sexual conduct between minors,” and
sodomy, “[l]ike vaginal intercourse, . . . carries with it a risk of

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38–42.
Id. at 41.
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184

sexually transmitted diseases.” Neither of these interests is sufficient
to justify infringing the right to privacy, however. First, if the state
intended to prevent minors from engaging in sexual conduct in
R.L.C.–like situations, then it would also have made vaginal
185
intercourse between minors unlawful in the same circumstances.
The state’s contention is similar to the one Justice Powell dismissed in
his Carey opinion, in which he argued that the state’s decision to
allow the same minors to marry, which “sanctions sexual intercourse
between the partners,” contradicted the state’s interest in deterring
186
minors from engaging in sexual intercourse. Prohibiting oral sex but
not vaginal intercourse does not deter minors from engaging in sexual
conduct: if anything, it may encourage them to escalate their sexual
interactions to avoid criminal activity.
Second, the North Carolina court itself acknowledged that both
vaginal intercourse and oral sex carry the risk of sexually transmitted
187
disease. Adolescents are significantly less likely to contract sexually
188
transmitted diseases when engaging in oral sex versus vaginal sex. In
addition, vaginal intercourse involves an additional risk: teenage
pregnancy. Because oral sex raises a much lower risk of diseases and
other complications and the state has no other interest in uniquely
prohibiting it, North Carolina is most likely attempting to maintain
animosity toward a nontraditional sexual practice the Supreme Court
has held the Constitution protects. Though even an incorrect fear of
disease arguably could survive rational basis review, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence did not explicitly apply rational basis
review to the question of sexual privacy. Lawrence left unclear
189
precisely what level of scrutiny it was applying. Lawrence was
explicit, however, in stating that a state’s animosity toward
nontraditional sexual relationships was not a permissible state interest

184. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 925 (N.C. 2007).
185. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007) (criminalizing only sexual
activity between a minor under the age of thirteen and anyone more than three years older).
R.L.C. was only two years older than his twelve-year-old girlfriend. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at
922.
186. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 707 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the result).
187. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 925.
188. Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher et al., Oral Versus Vaginal Sex Among Adolescents:
Perceptions, Attitudes, and Behavior, 115 PEDIATRICS 845, 848 (2005).
189. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 846 (discussing various interpretations of the
standard applied in Lawrence).
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in the due process context when considering a right to sexual
190
privacy.
In North Carolina and Virginia, the high courts ruled that their
states may punish sodomy between minors more severely than
vaginal intercourse, even when sexual intercourse is not a criminal
offense. Lawrence held that prohibitions on sodomy between adults,
however, cannot be justified on the basis of moral aversion, and
because states lack any other compelling state interest, prohibitions
on sodomy are unconstitutional violations of the right to privacy.
Danforth and Carey held that minors may possess the same rights to
privacy as adults unless the state has a significant state interest unique
to the context of minors. But as the high courts of Florida, Kansas,
and California have concluded, states lack a significant interest to
justify burdening a minor’s right to sexual privacy once that state has
concluded minors may lawfully consent to sexual activity in general.
Therefore, even though North Carolina and Virginia have enhanced
powers to regulate the activities of minors under the doctrine of
parens patriae, they do not have the power to regulate the form of
sexuality expressed within the relationships they sanction. The
protections of Lawrence v. Texas should be extended to minors.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF R.L.C. AND MCDONALD
Much more than the defendants’ liberty was at stake in R.L.C.
and McDonald. Not at issue was whether the state could regulate
minors’ sexual activity: if the legislatures of North Carolina and
Virginia wanted to prohibit minors from engaging in any sexual
191
activity, they likely could constitutionally do so. Rather, these cases
raised two overarching issues. First and most importantly, how can
states best protect minors from harm? Second, what, if anything,
remains of the longstanding animosity toward nontraditional sexual
activity? These questions are interrelated.
Lawrence created a problem beyond mere confusion over
minors’ rights to privacy: it cast doubt on the sufficiency of preLawrence penal codes that purportedly protect minors from sexbased harms. As Virginia’s statutory system indicates, states have
relied on general prohibitions of sodomy when determining how to

190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
191. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.17 (declining to decide whether minors have an
independent right to sexual privacy that would prohibit all governmental regulation).
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192

criminalize teenage sexual activity. Virginia’s age-of-consent laws
193
only address vaginal intercourse with a minor, creating a loophole in
the scheme if other sodomy laws are invalid. McDonald sought to
take advantage of this loophole, arguing that, because the literal
language of the statute only criminalized vaginal intercourse and not
194
oral sex, he was innocent of any criminal offense. Although
McDonald’s argument was technically correct, the legislature’s
omission likely resulted from its reliance on the general prohibition
against sodomy to do the rest of the work to protect minors from
sexual predators. It is entirely possible, however, that the Virginia
legislature would have intended to punish oral sex between them at
least to the same extent it punishes vaginal intercourse. Yet if
Lawrence took the sodomy statute out of the picture by invalidating
it, the remaining code does not punish oral sex with a minor. Thus,
following Lawrence, legislatures should revisit their penal codes to
ensure both that they are adequately protecting children and that
their laws do not violate minors’ rights to privacy.
In addition to exposing the inadequacy of existing law to
constitutionally protect minors, R.L.C. and McDonald suggest that
animosity toward nontraditional sexuality is very much alive, even
195
though the Supreme Court attempted to dispel it.
In their
willingness to treat nontraditional sexual activity more harshly than
traditional sex, the Virginia and North Carolina courts are not alone.
These cases are part of a larger history, dating at least to the reign of
196
Henry VIII, of legal animosity toward nontraditional sexuality.
Continuing this tradition, R.L.C. and McDonald join other cases
outside the context of minors that have resisted Lawrence’s landmark
decision and unfairly condemned nontraditional sexual activity. For
example, several courts have distinguished the private actions of
Lawrence and his partner from more public contexts. State high
courts have concluded that sodomy prosecutions are still valid when
192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (2004 & Supp. 2008) (criminalizing only vaginal
intercourse with a minor older than fifteen as a misdemeanor, rather than other forms of sex).
193. Id.
194. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918, 923 (Va. 2007) (arguing that the
statute governing statutory rape refers only to “sexual intercourse” and does not address other
sexual acts).
195. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice . . . .” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting))).
196. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the accused committed the act in public (as a charge added to public
197
indecency accusations) or when the case involves prostitution (as a
198
charge added to prostitution charges). Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit held Lawrence has no bearing on Alabama’s ban on the sale
of sex toys because the state has an interest in preserving “public
199
200
morality.” Others have addressed this public-private distinction,
and it represents another way—other than the age of the
participants—that courts have limited Lawrence to its facts to avoid
recognizing nontraditional sexual behavior as legitimate.
Animosity toward oral sex is archaic; it represents a fundamental
incomprehension of the reality of teenage sexuality. According to a
study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 44 percent
of males and 42 percent of females between the ages of fifteen and
201
seventeen have engaged in oral sex in the United States. Under the
law the supreme courts of North Carolina and Virginia articulated,
nearly half of the teenagers in North Carolina and Virginia are felons.
Moreover, by the time these teenagers reach their midforties,
202
approximately 90 percent of them will have engaged in oral sex.
Without the Supreme Court’s Lawrence decision, nearly all of the
people in both North Carolina and Virginia would be felons under
the same general prohibition of sodomy under which R.L.C. was
convicted.
These statistics cast serious doubt on whether the legislatures of
these states actually intended the results their supreme courts reached
or whether these courts’ decisions were rather the result of the
legislatures’ failures to update their penal codes following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence. Oral sex is no longer regarded
as nontraditional—it is typical. When 90 percent of a state’s

197. Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 685–86 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing
the facts of Lawrence from sodomy offenses committed in public rather than in the defendant’s
home).
198. State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1238 (La. 2005) (distinguishing Lawrence from cases
in which the sodomy charges related to prostitution).
199. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2004).
200. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis & Shannon Gilreath, Transforming Teenagers into Oral
Sex Felons: The Persistence of the Crime Against Nature After Lawrence v. Texas, 43 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 155, 188 (2008) (noting a North Carolina court’s interpretation of Lawrence as
invalidating the crime-against-nature statute when applied to private, but not public, sexual
conduct).
201. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25.
202. See id. (citing data showing that 90.1 percent of males and 88.3 percent of females aged
25–44 have engaged in oral sex).
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population could be considered a felon, enforcing these statutes
defies logic. Thus, in addition to revisiting their penal codes to ensure
that state laws adequately protect minors from sexual exploitation,
states should ensure that their statutory regimes reflect modern
sexual mores.
These decisions and the continuing animosity toward
nontraditional sexuality they appear to exhibit also may produce the
opposite of the law’s intended result: they expose the vast majority of
teenagers who engage in oral sex to new harms the criminal justice
system may cause. One of the principal focuses of the Supreme Court
in Lawrence was the stigma associated with prohibiting sodomy. That
stigma comes, as Professor Tribe suggests, from degrading the sexual
relationship in which individuals participate in nontraditional sexual
203
acts.
According to the Supreme Court, “[w]hen homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
204
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” That
logic extends beyond application to just homosexuals: when the state
makes nontraditional sexuality criminal, that declaration invites
people to subject its participants—gay and straight—to discrimination
and humiliation. Adolescents struggling with the development of
their sexuality need encouragement from the state, not humiliation.
CONCLUSION
R.L.C., McDonald, and this Note address a situation in which a
minor willfully participates in consensual but nontraditional sexual
activity when traditional sex would have been lawful. Admittedly, as
Justice Timmons-Goodson of the North Carolina Supreme Court
wrote, “[s]exual activity by young people with limited life experience
205
and education is troubling.” But this concern does not justify
outlawing only some kinds of sexual behavior. When the state has
decided minors may lawfully engage in sexual intercourse, courts
should understand the protections Lawrence articulated to prevent
states from policing the specific acts in which those minors engage.

203. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1904 (“[T]he prohibition’s principal vice was its
stigmatization of intimate personal relationships between people of the same sex . . . .”).
204. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
205. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 926 (N.C. 2007) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Lawrence implied that the statutory regimes of many states are
unconstitutional and may no longer adequately protect minors.
Lawrence held that adults possess a right to sexual privacy, which the
state may not infringe for morality alone. Because the Supreme Court
has held that minors share similar rights to privacy when the state
lacks a unique interest to justify burdening that right, the protections
of Lawrence should be extended to minors. Thus, legislatures should
revisit their outdated sodomy laws, some of which have existed since
206
the reign of Henry VIII. If they redraft these statutes, legislatures
should consider the implications of due process and equal protection:
laws governing the sexual activity of minors should only regulate
nontraditional sexual activity to the same extent that the state
prohibits traditional sexual contact. Animosity toward the
nontraditional does not justify disparate treatment.
The long reign of Henry VIII needs to end.

206.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

